The Veil of Ignorance is a way of working out the basic institutions and structures of a just society. According to Rawls, [1], working out what justice requires demands that we think as if we are building society from the ground up, in a way that everyone who is reasonable can accept. If Rawls is telling the parties in the original position that they value something other than happiness or utility, then the original position is not a fair test between utilitarianism and Rawlss principles. Well, thats a good utilitarian reason to avoid having anyone lose out. 8 0 obj On the other, non-utilitarian alternatives are left out. WebRawls against utilitarianism We talked about Rawlss contention that the parties in the original position would reject maximizing average utility as the fundamental principle for When she was just a young girl, Sacagawea's tribe was attacked by an enemy tribe, the Hidatsa, and she was captured. Despite the vigor of his arguments against utilitarianism, however, some critics have contended that Rawls's own theory displays some of the very same features that he criticizes in the utilitarian position. Consequently, Rawls reasons, it makes no sense to take the riskier rather than the safer option. But the parties in the original position have to make a single decision that will never be repeated and that could have calamitous implications over the course of their entire lives. Leaving the utilitarians to one side for a moment, I think Rawls was trying to make a similar point about politics at the end of 28 and in 82. And if all or many precepts are treated as first principles, there is no gain in systematic clarity. In this way, we may be led to a monistic account of the good by an argument from the conditions of rational deliberation (TJ 556). But this makes it even less clear why classical utilitarianism should be associated with perfect altruism. Rawlss Egalitarianism reaffirms the centrality of one of the twentieth centurys foremost political philosophers in informing our thinking about the twin issues of poverty and inequality that confront us afresh in the post-pandemic world. We saw this when talking about libertarianism. In light of this assessment of the utilitarian conception of the good and his own defence of a pluralistic conception, Rawls's comment in section 15, that utilitarianism and his theory agree that the good is the satisfaction of rational desire (TJ 923) seems misleading at best. . Rawls sounds a similar note toward the end of Chapter One, where he observes that the several variants of the utilitarian view have long dominated our philosophical tradition and continue to do so, and this despite the persistent misgivings that utilitarianism so easily arouses (TJ 52). Second, they regard what Rawls calls stability as an important criterion for choosing principles. It is noteworthy that this argument against classical utilitarianism is developed without reference to the apparatus of the original position and is not dependent on that apparatus. Second, however, they have wondered why, if Rawls believes that it would be unduly risky for the parties to rely on probabilities that are not grounded in information about their society, he fails to provide them with that information. Around the year 1788, a Shoshone girl named Sacagawea, also known as Bird Woman, was born. WebRawls and utilitarianism Notes for October 30 Main points. In response, he argues that a benevolent person fitting this description would actually prefer justiceasfairness to classical utilitarianism. Rational citizens are then assumed to desire an overall package with as high a ranking as possible. But its fair to say that it has one dominant theme. It is ironic, therefore, that the author of that complaint not only is not opposed to holism about distributive justice but in fact is one of its strongest advocates. However, utilitarians reject the publicity condition. First, it may seem that the criticism simply does not apply to contemporary versions of utilitarianism which do not, in general, purport to construe the good hedonistically. Or, if TV isn't enough, do something else pleasurable: go to the opera, drink beer, master the piano, read Jeremy Bentham, etc. They adopt a particular rule for making decisions under uncertainty: maximize expected utility. From their point of view, the fact that the society is maximizing average utility would not make up for their losses. Rawls gives distinct arguments against two forms of utilitarianism: the classical version and the principle of average utility. @kindle.com emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. endobj (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. See The Appeal of Political Liberalism, Chapter Eight in this volume. Critics of utilitarianism, he says, have pointed out that many of its implications run counter to our moral convictions and sentiments, but they have failed to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it (TJ viii). to the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition (TJ viii). Web- For utilitarians justice is not an independent moral standard, distinct from their general principle, but rather they believe that maximization of happiness ultimately determines endobj These issues have been extensively discussed, and I will here simply assert that, despite some infelicities in Rawls's presentation, I believe he is correct to maintain that the parties would prefer his two principles to the principle of average utility. This is the flaw in Brian Barry's response to my earlier discussion (in The Appeal of Political Liberalism) of utilitarian participation in an overlapping consensus. 28 May 2006. However, even if the role of the argument against monism in Theory raises questions about the justificatory significance of the original position construction, and even if the philosophical character of the argument is in tension with the political turn taken in Rawls's later writings, I believe that the argument can stand on its own as an important challenge to utilitarian thought. Intuitionists do not believe that there are any priority rules that can enable us to resolve such conflicts; instead, we have no choice but to rely on our intuitive judgment to strike an appropriate balance in each case. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 80. The first, which I have already mentioned, is Rawls's aspiration to produce a theory that shares utilitarianism's systematic and constructive character. In light of this aspect of Rawls's theory, the temptation to claim that he attaches no more weight than utilitarianism does to the distinctions among persons, is understandable. d) It Only if the basic structure is regulated by Rawls's substantive conception of justice can the determination of individual shares be handled as a matter of pure procedural justice. This is presumably because the maximization of average utility could, in societies with certain features, require that the interests of some people be seriously compromised. The latter view is committed to increasing the population, even at the cost of lowering average utility while the former is not. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service. After reviewing John Rawls's arguments against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice and then examining Michael Sandel's and Robert Nozick's criticisms of those arguments, Scheffler points to three important similarities between utilitarianism and Rawls's own theory. He thinks this is true of those teleological theories he describes as perfectionist, of certain religious views, and also of classical utilitarianism in so far as its account of the good is understood hedonistically. The argument is that the parties, knowing that they exist and wishing only to advance their own interests, would have no desire to maximize the net aggregate satisfaction, especially since doing so might require growth in the size of the population even at the expense of a significant reduction in the average utility per person. Yet, as noted above, Rawls explicitly states that an overlapping consensus is deep enough to include such fundamental ideas as the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation (PL 149, 15860, 1646), and the suggestion that classical utilitarianism might support the political conception as a workable approximation does not explain what attitude the utilitarian is now supposed to have toward that idea.32. Thoughts about God, culture, and the Real Jesus. They are not unrelated arguments. 9 0 obj And since their choice represents the core of Rawls's official case against utilitarianism, one effect of the way he deploys the argument against monism may be to jeopardize that case. In this essay, I will begin by reviewing Rawls's main arguments against utilitarianism. Third, they have questioned whether Rawls's principles can truly be said to guarantee the parties a satisfactory minimum and whether the parties, who are ignorant of their conceptions of the good, can truly be said to care little for gains above such a minimum. If they do use this rule, then they will reject average utility in favour of his two principles, since the maximin rule directs choosers to select the alternative whose worst outcome is superior to the worst outcome of any other alternative, and the two principles are those a person would choose if he knew that his enemy were going to assign him his place in society. (7) Raised to appreciate the value of nature, she paid rapt attention to sounds and sights, enabling her not only to locate food but to warn the others of possible danger. Utilitarianism, of course, achieves this aim by identifying a single principle as the ultimate standard for adjudicating among conflicting precepts. Thus, the excessive riskiness of relying on the principle of insufficient reason depends on the claim about the third condition, that is, on the possibility that average utility might lead to intolerable outcomes. As I have argued elswhere, neither Rawls nor the utilitarian thinks about distributive justice in this way.29 For them, the principles of distributive justice, holistically understood, are fixed without reference to any prior notion of desert, and individuals may then be said to deserve the benefits to which they are entitled according to the criteria established by just institutions. These chapters identify four, Which of the following is an accurate statement? Cited hereafter as TJ, with page references given parenthetically in the text. <> This possibility arises, Rawls suggests, because utilitarianism relies entirely on certain standard assumptions (TJ 159) to demonstrate that its calculations will not normally support severe restrictions on individual liberties. In 29, Rawls advances two arguments that, in my opinion, boil down to one. But utilitarianism has some problems. Rawls rejects utilitarianism because it might permit First, they have argued that the standard assumptions are sufficiently robust that it would not be excessively risky for the parties to choose average utility even if this meant relying on the principle of insufficient reason. It may be enough to show non-utilitarians why they reject utilitarianism, though. Rawls's conjecture is that the contract doctrine properly worked out can fill this gap (TJ 52). Nevertheless, there are some genuine commonalities between Rawls's conception of justice and utilitarianism, and these commonalities may be partly responsible for the perception that there is a tension between his endorsement of the former and his criticism of the latter. They help to explain why it can be tempting to think that Rawls's principles display the very faults for which he criticizes utilitarianism. See, for example, section 2 of The Basic Structure as Subject, where he associates the comprehensive interpretation with Sidgwick (PL 2602). WebHe thinks that Rawls rejects utilitarianism primarily because it lacks a fait principle ofdistribution and argues that a demand for justice and fair distribution does not yield any The basis for a valid desert claim, on this view, must always be some characteristic of or fact about the deserving person. Thus, in looking at the two versions of utilitarianism from the standpoint of the original position, a surprising contrast (TJ 189) between them is revealed. He may be correct in thinking he needs to show how a society regulated by his conception of justice could be stable despite the prevalence of diverse comprehensive doctrines. Rawls claims that these considerations favor his principles over utilitarianism because it is possible that some people would find life in a utilitarian society intolerable. WebAbstract. One of the few times he has anything substantial to say about it is when he includes classical utilitarianismthe utilitarianism of Bentham and Sidgwick, the strict classical doctrine (PL 170)among the views that might participate in an overlapping consensus converging on a liberal political conception of justice, the standard example (PL 164) of which is justiceasfairness. ), Find out more about saving to your Kindle, Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521651670.013. After reviewing John Rawls's arguments against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice and then examining Michael Sandel's and Robert Nozick's criticisms of those No loss would wipe them out and they will come out ahead in the long run. As Rawls says: The parties . I will then examine an argument by Nozick and by Michael Sandel to the effect that there is a tension between certain aspects of Rawls's theory and his criticisms of utilitarianism. Often, for example, we seem prepared to say that an individual deserves or has a right to some benefit, and that it is therefore just that he should get it, without inquiring into the larger distributional context. It should not be interpreted, as it sometimes has been, as the selfcontained presentation of a formal decisiontheoretic argument which is independent, for example, of the appeals to stability, selfrespect, and the strains of commitment in section 29. This is a point that he emphasizes in response to Habermas (PL 42133), and it explains what he means when he says in the index to PL (455) that justice is always substantive and never purely procedurala remark that might otherwise seem inconsistent with the role that Theory assigns to pure procedural justice. So long as the veil of ignorance prevents the parties from knowing their own identities, providing them with the relevant information about their society need not compromise their impartiality. Here is what that means. Some people understandably abhor many of the tendencies in modern life that create pressure to think holistically about distributive justice, and believe that our moral thought, rather than seeking to accommodate those tendencies, should serve as a source of resistance to them. We talked about Rawlss contention that the parties in the original position would reject maximizing average utility as the fundamental principle for their society. In summary, Rawls argues, the classical utilitarian view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator (TJ 27). Adopting one of them as a first principle is sure to lead to the neglect of other things that should be taken into account. In the Preface to A Theory of Justice,1 Rawls observes that [d]uring much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism (TJ vii). Whereas the maximin argument is presented as a reason why the parties would not choose utilitarianism, Rawls develops another important line of criticism whose ostensible relation to the original position construction is less straightforward.10 This line of criticism turns on a contrast between those views that take there to be but a single rational good for all human beings and those that conceive of the human good as heterogeneous. Herein lies the problem. Furthermore, Rawls asserts, the possibility that the society might allow some members to lose out would cause its members to lose self-esteem. They can assign probabilities to outcomes in the society they belong to. Rawls observes that the distribution of satisfaction within the society has no intrinsic significance for classical utilitarianism. But this suggests that the parties reject theories of justice that incorporate monistic conceptions of the good because Rawls's argument for pluralism has led him to design the original position in such a way as to guarantee that they will do so. Rawls believes that teleological theories, which define the good independently of the right and define the right as maximizing the good, tend also to interpret the good in monistic terms. 11 0 obj In his later work, however, it is the comprehensive version of utilitarianism that he himself treats as standard, and with which he contrasts his own institutional approach to justice. There is still a problem, of course, given his insistence in Theory that neither classical nor average utilitarianism can put fundamental liberal values on a sufficiently secure footing. Instead, the aim is to show that choosing as if one had such as aversion is rational given the unique features of . Furthermore, hedonism is the symptomatic drift of teleological theories (TJ 560) both because agreeable feeling may appear to be an interpersonal currency (TJ 559) that makes social choice possible and because hedonism's superficial hospitality to varied ways of life enables it to avoid the appearance of fanaticism and inhumanity (TJ 556). And the problem becomes more acute, for the reasons given above, when the overlapping consensus is conceived of as affirming not merely liberal principles in general but Rawls's theory of justice in particular. Instead, it is a constraint on the justice of distributions and institutions that they should give each individual what that individual independently deserves in virtue of the relevant facts about him or her. His own theory of justice, one might say, aims not to resist the pressures toward holism but rather to tame or domesticate them: to provide a fair and humane way for a liberal, democratic society to accommodate those pressures while preserving its basic values and maintaining its commitment to the inviolability of the individual. Yet these differences, important as they are, should not be allowed to obscure an important point of agreement, namely, that neither view is willing to assess the justice or injustice of a particular assignment of benefits in isolation from the larger distributional context.
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